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Abstract
Technological developments in gene editing raise high expectations for clinical applications, including editing of the
germline. The European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) and the European Society of Human
Genetics (ESHG) together developed a Background document and Recommendations to inform and stimulate ongoing
societal debates. This document provides the background to the Recommendations. Germline gene editing is currently not
allowed in many countries. This makes clinical applications in these countries impossible now, even if germline gene editing
would become safe and effective. What were the arguments behind this legislation, and are they still convincing? If a
technique could help to avoid serious genetic disorders, in a safe and effective way, would this be a reason to reconsider
earlier standpoints? This Background document summarizes the scientific developments and expectations regarding
germline gene editing, legal regulations at the European level, and ethics for three different settings (basic research,
preclinical research and clinical applications). In ethical terms, we argue that the deontological objections (e.g., gene editing
goes against nature) do not seem convincing while consequentialist objections (e.g., safety for the children thus conceived
and following generations) require research, not all of which is allowed in the current legal situation in European countries.
Development of this Background document and Recommendations reflects the responsibility to help society understand and
debate the full range of possible implications of the new technologies, and to contribute to regulations that are adapted to the
dynamics of the field while taking account of ethical considerations and societal concerns.
1 Introduction
Gene editing has attracted major attention from scientists
and the media in recent years. While scientists in labora-
tories witness a revolution, much of the conversation about
clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats-
Cas9 (CRISPR/Cas9) has revolved around its potential for
treating disease or editing the genes of human embryos [1].
Unlike experiments with zinc-finger nucleases and tran-
scription activator-like effector-based nucleases (TALEN),
the CRISPR/Cas9 system turned out to have unprecedented
ease and finesse. Treatment of cancer patients using gene
editing has started [2, 3]. Expectations are that many more
potential applications will follow. Ongoing trials are
reported for thalassemia and sickle cell disease, mucopo-
lysaccharidosis I and II, and haemophilia B, among others
(www.clinicaltrials.gov). These trials are preparing treat-
ment possibilities, for instance by studying treatment at the
human cellular level. Somatic gene editing may prove to be
a game changer not only in the treatment of a whole range
of serious hereditary, particularly Mendelian, disorders, but
also in the treatment of cancer and infectious diseases. Gene
editing is a medicinal product for human use, where reg-
ulations apply. The European Medicines Authority (EMA)
that oversees access of medicinal products to the market,
including advanced therapy medicinal products, has iden-
tified scientific and regulatory guidance on gene editing as
an issue for its future agenda [4]. Ethical, legal and societal
issues for somatic gene editing include safety and
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accessibility, and meaningful stakeholder engagement,
education, and dialogue must be organized [5]. However, if
somatic gene editing became safe and cheap, there would be
few other ethical or legal objections left.
For editing the genes of human embryos the situation is
different. The prospect of technologies coming available
that would allow making changes in the (human) germline
has been heavily debated in recent decades, and in many
countries germline interventions have been prohibited,
sometimes even accompanied by criminal sanctions [6]. In
previous decades, legislation has been developed not
allowing changes in the human germline, including the
Convention for the protection of human rights and dignity
of the human being with regard to the application of biology
and medicine, often referred to as the Oviedo Convention
[7] and the recent Clinical Trials Regulation (No. 536/2014)
[8]. What were the arguments behind this legislation, and do
these still apply? If a technique can help to avoid serious
genetic disorders, in a safe and effective way, would this be
a reason to reconsider earlier standpoints? Discussion with
relevant stakeholders is needed, including professional
health care workers, patients, citizens, and legal and ethical
experts. Globally and also within Europe there is diversity,
as several countries have not ratified the Oviedo Conven-
tion, which prohibits any (human) germline modification.
Meanwhile in the USA a summit was organized in
December 2015, that brought together scientists, ethicists,
legal experts and patient groups from around the world [9].
The recent report published by the National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine argues that 'Scientists
should be permitted to modify human embryos destined for
implantation in the womb to eliminate devastating genetic
diseases such as sickle-cell anaemia or cystic fibrosis—once
gene-editing techniques advance sufficiently for use in
people and proper restrictions are in place' [10, 11]. Fur-
thermore, altering human embryos in the laboratory for the
sake of basic research should be acceptable. The report of
the National Academies [11] outlines strict limits under
which scientists could proceed in the future. It recommends
restricting the technique to severe medical conditions for
which no other treatment exists.
We thus witness that initiatives have been taken world-
wide to exchange views about responsible innovation using
human gene editing, including germline gene editing
(GLGE). Modifications in the germline genome have been
considered a much more sensitive issue than somatic gene
editing. The recent scientific advances rekindle ethical and
policy questions surrounding the acceptability of germline
modification [6]. While in the past some may have con-
sidered the question of acceptability of germline gene
modification not urgent because it was technically impos-
sible, the current scientific developments make the issue
more urgent than ever. Also, the international differences
and potential for cross-border movements of patients make
societal debate urgent.
The European Society of Human Genetics (ESHG) and
the European Society of Human Reproduction and
Embryology (ESHRE) consider it to be their professional
responsibility to contribute to further discussion on GLGE.
As in earlier collaboration between the ESHG and other
professional societies, a Background document and
Recommendations have been developed. The current text is
the Background document. Its aim is to inform and stimu-
late ongoing societal debate and serve as a background for
ESHG/ESHRE Recommendations. Drafts of the Back-
ground document and Recommendations were prepared by
a joint writing group. These were discussed in both com-
mittees and in a joint meeting of the two societies on
September 20, 2016. A draft of the recommendations was
online on the ESHG and the ESHRE website from october
17 until December 2, 2016 forming the backdrop for its
presentation at the American Society of Human Genetics
meeting in Vancouver. This Background document together
with the Recommendations were subsequently posted
online on the ESHG and the ESHRE websites to solicit
comments from experts and the membership of both the
ESHG and ESHRE from April 3 until May 8, 2017. The
authors integrated the suggestions to the background
document where appropriate. The endorsed recommenda-
tions are available in the European Journal of Human
Genetics [12] and in Human Reproduction Open [13].
2 Scientific developments and expectations
regarding GLGE
It is first of all important to distinguish the target population
of cells on which gene editing can be performed, being
somatic cells, pluripotent stem cells (PSC) or the germ cells.
Gene modifications in somatic cells, or mostly in PSC, are
intended for the patients themselves and would not usually
be transmitted to the progeny. In contrast, gene editing in
the germline, and in some cases in PSC that become dif-
ferentiated to germ cells in vitro, would change the indivi-
dual’s hereditary genetic profile and would thus be
transmitted to future generations (Fig. 1) [14]. Besides the
gene editing in nuclear DNA, also experiments aiming at
gene editing in mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) can be con-
sidered as gene editing in the germline. Like editing nuclear
DNA, transmission of genetically edited mtDNA can be
used to eliminate mutant mitochondria or alter the mtDNA
and be transmitted to offspring. The use of donor cytoplasm
to replace one set of mitochondria with a different set is a
distinct method of germline modification that does not
involve gene editing technologies. In theory, gene-edited
somatic cells could be used for somatic cell nuclear
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transfer (SCNT) aimed at producing genetically modified
descendants [15]. There is a worldwide moratorium on
human reproductive cloning, so the latter use of SCNT
technology is not considered ethically acceptable in humans
at present.
As for the stage at which germ line modifications could
be introduced, scientists envisage that this would be carried
out at the level of the germ cell or its progenitor cells during
gametogenesis in vitro (Fig. 1) [14], or later at the stage of
the fertilized oocyte (zygote) or in the early embryo. State
of the art literature for these possible germline modifications
is discussed below.
2.1 Gene editing in zygotes or pre-implantation
embryos
For germ-line modifications in experimental settings the
genomic editing system is mostly injected into the cyto-
plasm or pronuclei of zygotes or into pre-implantation
embryos, after which genetic screening is used to select the
embryos with a corrected genomic pattern in the absence of
detectable off-target genetic modifications. Should this turn
out to be safe and effective, then similar applications in the
clinic are conceivable. Subsequently, prenatal testing using
either cell-free foetal DNA from the pregnant woman’s
blood or one of the more invasive methods (chorionic villus
sampling or amniocentesis), could in theory verify whether
or not a foetus shows molecular or genomic mosaicism.
Mosaic embryos arise as a result of inefficient cutting of the
nucleases or inaccurate DNA repair before the embryo has
reached the stage of cleavage. The pre-implantation embryo
stage is generally not favoured for genome editing as it
would most likely lead to a mosaic individual and possibly
to more unforeseen detrimental effects. Various studies in
different animal models have demonstrated the feasibility of
gene editing in animals at the zygote stage [16–19]. The
potential of the technology to prevent the onset of a genetic
disorder in mice was demonstrated by the studies of Wu
et al. [20] and Long et al. [21], respectively, for cataract and
Duchenne muscular dystrophy. Also in non-human pri-
mates, microinjection of Cas9 or TALENs into zygotes led
to the birth of targeted gene-modified offspring [22–24]. In
mammalian zygotes, the efficiency of the correction of an
indel in a single gene by TALENs or Cas9 ranges from 0.5
to 40.9% per injected zygote [25]. Ran et al. [26] reported
that the double nicking by RNA-guided CRISPR/Cas9
nickase treatment can lead to 80–100% efficiency in mouse
blastocysts. Regarding gene modification in subsequent
neonates, the efficiencies of indel and gene addition were
0–41.7% by TALENs or Cas9, and 1.7 and 3.0% by Cas9,
respectively. In the targeted gene modifications, the effi-
ciency is 2.0–6.0% in mouse offspring, coinciding with off-
target mutations [25].
In the human, researchers are restricted by the limited
availability of embryos because of ethical and/or legal
constraints. Most supernumerary (‘spare’) human embryos
available for research will have progressed beyond the
cleavage stage, giving rise to more mosaicism when geno-
mic editing is attempted. Only in countries where the
creation of embryos for the exclusive purpose of research is
allowed could this technique be applied at earlier stages and
with fresh oocytes/embryos. One alternative source would
be oocytes that failed to be fertilized, which could then be
fertilized or artificially activated and subsequently used for
genomic editing for research purposes. Alternatively,
abnormally fertilized zygotes (mostly 1 pronucleus (PN) or
3PN) could be used, as was the case in two recent Chinese
reports [27, 28]. Of the 86 injected 3PN human zygotes,
four (4.7%) contained the correct genetic material repaired
through non-homologous end joining (NHEJ) [27]. The
genomic edited embryos were mosaic, similar to findings in
other model systems [29–31]. In addition, a substantial
number of ‘off-target’ mutations were observed, either
caused by the inefficient CRISPR/Cas9 complex acting in
other parts of the genome and/or the abnormal triploid
chromosomal content originating from the abnormally fer-
tilized 3PN zygotes. Also in another more recent study [28],
the efficiency of homology directed repair (HDR) of the
CCR5Δ32 allele was low, and the edited embryos origi-
nating from 3PN zygotes were mosaic. It has to be noted
that neither of the studies in the human used the most up-to-
date CRISPR/Cas9 methods [27, 28]. Recently, some
alternative methods used in mice significantly increased the
efficiency of genomic editing technology while, at the same
time eliminating mosaicism in reconstructed embryos.
Even if ethical/legal barriers for embryo research could
be removed and the supply of zygotes or embryos was fully
resolved, significant technical hurdles would remain. These
need to be tackled to gain control of the genotype of both
alleles in a viable embryo. For example, microinjection of
the genomic tool machinery into zygotes only (not
embryos) is a technically demanding and labour-intensive
procedure, which can hamper subsequent embryo devel-
opment. As an alternative, a simple electroporation-based
strategy to deliver Cas9/sgRNA ribonucleoproteins into
mouse zygotes was proposed, with 100% efficiency for
in vivo genome editing and no decrease in embryo viability
[32]. A similar technology was recently used by Hashimoto
et al. [33], who claimed that electroporation of the Cas9
protein/sgRNA into early pronuclear zygotes generates non-
mosaic embryos in the mouse. The key to success was
performing the electroporation into the fertilized zygotes
very early, enabling the genomic editing to occur before the
first replication (S-phase) of the mouse genomic DNA.
In a recent breakthrough article that appeared after the
round of discussion in the professional Societies as
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Fig. 1 Overview of the possible strategies to perform genome editing
in the germline in men and women. SC stem cell, MII metaphase-II,
GV germinal vesicle, iPS induced pluripotent stem cells, CRISPR
clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats. (Repub-
lished with permission from Vassena et al. [14].)
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discussed in the Introduction of this document, the group of
Mitalipov [34] described the correction of a heterozygous
mutation present in sperm by highly efficient genomic
editing using CRISPR/Cas9 based targeting in human
embryos. Interestingly, the double-strand breaks were pre-
dominantly repaired by the wild-type homologous maternal
gene in the oocyte instead of the synthetic DNA that was
supplemented during injection. The highest efficiency, with
avoidance of mosaicism in the resulting edited embryos and
the absence of off-targets, was achieved when the CRISPR/
Cas9 tool was injected at the time of fertilization, when
injecting the mutated sperm. This was not the case when
traditional genomic editing was performed at the zygote
stage, the latter resulting in lower efficiency of correctly
edited embryos and the presence of mosaicism.
Next, identifying genome-wide off-target sites is impor-
tant to avoid and prevent, or at least reduce, false positive
and false negative sites; concomitantly, accurate methods to
measure off-target mutation frequencies have to be devel-
oped. Current genome wide sequencing platforms often
cannot detect off-target sites at frequencies below 0.1%.
Nowadays next-generation sequencing (NGS) technologies
have been successfully applied to reveal off-target genetic
modifications after application of, for example, CRISPR/
Cas technology. Through whole genome sequencing
(WGS), thousands to millions of sequencing reactions can
be performed in parallel allowing genome wide screening
more rapidly in a high throughput manner. The data can be
analysed by the CRISPR Genome Analyzer platform
(CRISPR-GA), currently a popular bio-informatics tool that
provides information on size and location of indels and on
the efficiency of NHEJ and HDR events. A recently
developed, easy-to-use bioinformatics tool for batch ana-
lysis of NGS-generated genome editing data allows detec-
tion of indel mutations and other precise genome editing
events as well as rapid calculation of the corresponding
mutagenesis efficiencies [35]. This progress in off-target
detection will help ensure that the CRISPR/Cas or similar
gene editing technologies work in a safe and accurate
manner.
2.2 Gene editing of male and female germ cells
An alternative to the zygote/embryo approach is to perform
gene modifications during early gametogenesis. In this
manner, growing immature oocytes or sperm or even pre-
cursor cells (primordial germ cells) can be gene targeted by
using the CRISPR/Cas system, producing genetically cor-
rected mature sperm or oocytes that subsequently can be
used for ART. In the male germ cell line, spermatogonial
stem cells (SSC) can be harvested more and more effi-
ciently, and in vitro culture systems are being developed,
also in the human, and optimized for efficient production of
sperm in vitro. So far, animal models have indicated that
SSC can be propagated as clones in culture and then
transplanted back into the testis to generate mature and
functional sperm [36]. So a potential strategy would be to
select SSC clones that have undergone correct genomic
editing and are free from off-target mutations. These can
then be transplanted to undergo final maturation in vivo.
Alternatively, the gene edited SSC can be directly differ-
entiated in vitro to mature gene-corrected sperm, to be used
for IVF. Still, optimisation of in vitro culture systems is
warranted, especially in the human, so that gene editing
technologies can be employed safely and with high
efficiency.
In the female germ line, the oocyte is more easily
accessible for genetic manipulation, but currently technical
hurdles remain, such as the small number of oocytes that are
available [14]. It has been suggested that oogonia-like stem
cells could be harvested, cultured and expanded followed
by culture in vitro to the mature metaphase II stage [37].
However, there is still controversy over the existence of
such oocyte precursor cells in the female and the efficiency
at which mature, developmentally competent oocytes can be
derived from them.
A last possibility is to produce gametes in vitro from
PSC. These PSC could either be human embryonic stem
cells, made genetically identical to the prospective parent by
somatic cell nuclear transfer, or PSC obtained through the
direct reprogramming of differentiated cells (induced PSC,
iPSC). One advantage of this approach is that PSC in cul-
ture are easy to manipulate to correct genetic abnormalities.
PSCs can be grown easily in bulk amounts, especially in the
naive state of pluripotency [38–40], and sustain single cell
passaging, which makes them an ideal source for gene
editing experiments with the CRISPR/Cas system. Ulti-
mately, these PSC have to be differentiated towards oocytes
or sperm that would contain the genetically corrected
information and can thus be used in ART. PSC-derived
gametes were successfully established in mice [41, 42],
although this approach still required a maturation step
in vivo in order to obtain functional oocytes or sperm.
Nowadays, full differentiation of mouse embryonic stem
cells into mature functional sperm [43] and oocytes [44] has
been achieved in vitro. If this strategy proves successful in
the human, despite the system’s greater complexity, geno-
mic editing might well be successfully applied to produce
gene edited gametes and offspring in the future.
2.3 Genome editing in the mtDNA
Another form of DNA modification, albeit not in the nuclear
DNA, involves the transfer of donor mitochondria con-
taining mtDNA from one cell to another [45], or the use of
genomic editing in the mtDNA to eliminate mutant
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mitochondria or at least change the heteroplasmy ratio (the
proportion of abnormal copies of mtDNA) in progeny, for
example, in order to rescue deficiencies in oxidative phos-
phorylation [46–48]. This mtDNA modification (whether
achieved by mitochondrial replacement technique (MRT) or
by editing of the original mtDNA) should be considered as a
genome-altering procedure, which can be passed on to
future generations. Note that in MRT the genome is not
edited, and different safety and efficacy considerations
apply when compared to gene editing. In theory, mtDNA
modification can also cause heteroplasmy, containing two
or more sets of genetically different mtDNA in the resulting
oocytes, as a result of an incomplete elimination of mito-
chondria with mutant mtDNA or of undetected off-target
effects (genetic or epigenetic). More recently, MRT has
been proposed to overcome maternal transmission of ser-
ious mtDNA disorders. For nuclear transfer, the nucleus of
an oocyte from a patient with a known mtDNA mutation is
transferred into a healthy enucleated donor oocyte (spindle
transfer) or zygote (pronucleus transfer) to overcome
mtDNA disorders. The safety and efficacy of this nuclear
transfer technology has been mostly studied in animal
models but has also been shown to cause little if any het-
eroplasmy in human tripronuclear embryos [45]. These
nuclear transfer technologies appear to be efficient in terms
of embryonic development and safe in terms of minimal
mtDNA carryover [45, 49]. In April 2016, the first child
resulting from maternal spindle transfer was born [50]. The
mother was an asymptomatic carrier of a mitochondrial
mutation that caused Leigh syndrome, a fatal neurological
disorder. The child, who has 1% of its mother’s mtDNA,
was healthy at 3 months, although it is not known if any
abnormality might appear later on. The use of gene editing
technology appears also to correct mtDNA disorders. In a
heteroplasmic mouse model containing two genetic back-
grounds of mtDNA, selective prevention of germline
transmission of one kind of mtDNA has been accomplished
using either mitochondria-targeted restriction endonucleases
or TALENs [51]. CRISPR/Cas9 has also been successfully
employed in mtDNA editing, and mitoCas9a (a new version
of the enzyme Cas9) with specific localization to the
mitochondria has been developed [47].
2.4 Rationale for germ cell genomic editing
The following lines of basic research involving genome
editing technology in the germline can be considered:
addressing fundamental questions of early human and ani-
mal developmental biology; gaining information to under-
stand and improve the technique and safety of genome
editing itself; and engineering specific disease-related
mutations in embryos used as experimental animal mod-
els, to subsequently analyse the genome edited offspring or
derivative PSC for the development of drugs or other
treatments for disease. These research applications are
important for gaining more insight into basic developmental
biology regardless of any potential future human repro-
ductive GLGE. So far, most of our knowledge of early
embryonic development is based on animal models, espe-
cially the mouse. However, recent studies have shown that
the molecular pathways involved during early embryonic
development differ between animal models and humans.
For example, the SOX17 gene was recently demonstrated,
by the use of human embryonic stem cells, to be crucial for
the formation of primordial germ cells in the human, while
this is not the case in the mouse [52]. Accordingly, in the
UK, a license was approved in 2016 for Dr Niakan (The
Francis Crick Institute) [53] to study early lineage segre-
gations in humans. This will hopefully allow us to under-
stand the molecular pathways involved in early embryonic
development and differentiation, and might, for example,
also be beneficial for disentangling complex or poorly
understood causes of infertility (such as implantation fail-
ure) and developing novel routes for treatments.
Germline editing technology could potentially also be
applied to other infertility related treatments. For example, it
has been shown that mutations in the phospholipase C zeta
(PLCz) gene, which is responsible for successful oocyte
activation, can lead to failed fertilization after ICSI [54].
Two point mutations in the exons of the PLCz gene were
identified, one paternally, and one maternally inherited [55].
These might be corrected by genomic editing during sper-
matogenesis of the male patient or following the strategy of
first deriving patient specific stem cells, followed by gene
correction in stem cells and finally differentiation towards
functional sperm containing the corrected PLCz gene and
function. Similarly, variants in the polo-like kinase 4 gene
(PLK4) which predispose to embryonic aneuploidy [56]
might be corrected in the female germ line and thereby
increase the chance of obtaining more euploid embryos for
implantation and conception of a genetically normal child.
3 Legal regulations regarding GLGE
(European level)
The focus of this paragraph is on transnational, in particular
European, regulation of embryo research and germline
genetic modification. The international regulatory landscape
for developing GLGE has been summarized by Araki and
Ishii [25] and Isasi et al.[6].
3.1 Embryo research
An important element in this landscape is the variation of
national legislation governing embryo research among
Innovation in human germline gene editing: the background 455
European countries. On the one side of the spectrum, some
countries (e.g., Austria, Germany, Italy) forbid all research
using human embryos (only excepting ‘non-instrumenta-
lizing’ research aimed at benefitting the embryo in ques-
tion). On the other side, a limited number of countries (e.g.,
the UK, Belgium and Sweden) allow the creation of human
embryos for research purposes. In between, are countries
(e.g., France, Portugal, the Netherlands) allowing human
embryo research using supernumerary (left-over or spare)
IVF-embryos, while explicitly forbidding the creation of
human embryos for purposes other than pregnancy.
At the European level, an important document is the
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Oviedo
Convention) of the Council of Europe [7] that has been
ratified by 29 states. Article 18, part 2, of this Convention
forbids the creation of human embryos for research pur-
poses. As ratification requires further national legislation by
the ratifying partners to be in line with the Convention,
countries having ratified this document are bound to
maintain this ban.
To the extent that human embryo research aimed at
developing GLGE requires normal one-cell stage embryos,
these embryos will have to be created specifically for the
purpose. As a consequence, this research can be carried out
in a limited number of European countries, depending on
further regulatory conditions also with regard to accepted
purposes. Should the research move to investigating GLGE
in blastomeres, supernumerary IVF-embryos could be used
in countries allowing research with those embryos,
depending again on further conditions. Given the ethical
sensitivity both of creating embryos for research and of
asking women to donate the necessary oocytes, the principle
of subsidiarity (as for instance laid down in the Belgian
Embryos Act, Article 4 part 1) requires that no human
embryos should be created for research that can be per-
formed equally well with spare embryos [57].
3.2 Germline genetic modification
The scope for future clinical, reproductive application of
GLGE will depend on legislation conditionally allowing,
rather than categorically forbidding, procedures aimed at
modifying the human germline. Whereas most countries
(based on recent surveys) currently prohibit germline
modification, many of the concepts used in relevant legal
documents are ill-defined and ambiguous, including the
distinction between research and clinical applications and
basic definitions [6, 25]. For instance, whereas the Belgian
Embryos Act does not contain a categorical ban on germline
modification, it contains a provision (Article 5 part 4) for-
bidding 'research or treatment with a eugenic purpose, that
is: aiming at the selection or enhancement of non-pathologic
genetic traits of the human species' [57].
Here again, the Convention on Human Rights and Bio-
medicine (Oviedo Convention) of the Council of Europe is
a key document [7]. Article 13 states that “An intervention
seeking to modify the human genome may only be under-
taken for preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic purposes and
only if its aim is not to introduce any modification in the
genome of any descendants”.
There has been much debate about whether MRT aimed at
helping women at risk of transmitting a mitochondrial dis-
order to have healthy children should be regarded as a form
of germline modification [58–60]. MRT refers to procedures
in which the pronuclei, meiotic spindle or polar bodies of the
prospective mother’s oocytes are transferred to an enucleated
donor oocyte [61]. While UK legislation prohibits clinical
applications of germline modification, this ban does not
apply to MRT, given recent regulations specifically allowing
the reproductive use of this technology subject to some
conditions. As these regulations specify the method used in
MRT (germline transplantation rather than editing), this has
no implications for a potential use of GLGE of mtDNA.
The legal context is different in the Netherlands, where
legislation was also adapted to allow for MRT [62]. As this
was achieved by limiting the ban on reproductive germline
modification in the 2002 Dutch Embryo Act [63] to the
intentional modification of the nuclear DNA (Article 24g), it
would seem that not only MRT, but also clinical GLGE of
mtDNA is beyond the scope of the legal prohibition of
germline modification in the Netherlands. Whether the legis-
lator would have accepted this implication is an open question
as GLGE was not yet available when the Act was drafted.
These are only a few out of many examples of how leg-
islation in this field tends to lag behind the dynamics of the
very technologies that it means to regulate [6]. Considering
the dynamics of the scientific discoveries and medical
developments it is relevant to reflect on what the arguments
were behind such legislation. Do these still apply? If a
technique can help to avoid serious genetic disorders, in a
safe and effective way, would this be a reason to reconsider
earlier standpoints? It should be considered to structure a
legal framework that could be more flexible and promptly
reactive to the evolution of the technologies and possibilities,
under an appropriate societal oversight.
From an ethical point of view, scientists and clinicians
must respect the legal and regulatory framework in their
country. They also have an important responsibility to help
society understand and debate the full range of possible
implications of the new technologies, and to contribute to
regulations that are adapted to the dynamics of the field while
taking account of ethical considerations and societal con-
cerns. As the European professional and scientific organiza-
tions most comprehensively involved in the development of
GLGE technology, ESHRE and the ESHG are well placed
and willing to take up this responsibility.
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4 Ethics
While the scenario of future genetic modification in the
human germline has been a topic of debate for decades,
recent developments in genome editing give a new impetus
to ethical and societal discussions. For an adequate debate
and reflection, it is important to make a distinction between
(non-reproductive) basic GLGE-research, (non-reproduc-
tive) preclinical GLGE-research, and possible future human
reproductive, clinical, GLGE, taking account of both moral
concerns and objections, and possible scientific and clinical
advantages of GLGE. Although the distinction between
basic and preclinical research is important, there may well
be an overlap between these types of research. For instance,
basic research may aim at improving the precision of the
technology, thereby lowering the risk of off-target effects
and enabling future clinical GLGE.
4.1 Basic research
4.1.1 Possible advantages
A general advantage of basic research is that it will generate
new scientific knowledge, which may contribute to
improving human health and welfare. GLGE-linked basic
research mostly regards the study of fundamental questions
regarding human embryology and the methods applied in
gene editing. A good example concerns the plans of
researchers in, for example, the UK to study genetic factors
linked with early embryo development, implantation and
problems with both development and implantation. This
may help to improve the success rate of assisted
reproduction.
4.1.2 Objections and concerns
There are different types of ethical objections, both deon-
tological and consequentialist, to basic research regarding
human GLGE, especially insofar as this involves the
research use of human embryos.
4.1.2.1 Deontological objections and concerns Question-
ing the ‘instrumentalizing’ use of human embryos in basic
GLGE research relates to a wider legal and ethical debate on
embryo research that has been evolving over more than
three decades worldwide. Critics of ‘instrumentalizing’
embryo research mostly argue that such research is at odds
with the proclaimed high, even ‘person-like’, status of the
embryo.
This view is, however, widely contested [64–66].
Although the moral status of the early embryo is significant,
there is wide support, both in secular ethics and in various
religions, for the view that at least the early embryo has a
lower moral status than a foetus, and much lower than a
child and adult. For that reason, legal regulations and ethical
principles and guidelines regarding medical research with
human subjects, aimed at protecting research participants
from serious harm, do not apply to early (preimplantation)
embryos in vitro (especially if these embryos will not be
transferred). (The arguments for this view differ and relate,
for example, to the lack of sentience and cognitive
functions, and/or the lack of so-called ‘ontological indivi-
duality’; after all, the early embryo may still split, or
different embryos may combine to build one single
embryo.) Against this background, many countries have
accepted a regulatory approach which leaves room for at
least some embryo research on (more or less strict)
conditions, including proportionality and subsidiarity (see
section 3.1).
Parthenotic embryos (‘parthenotes’) and 3PN embryos can
and have been used as alternatives for ‘normal’ embryos in
research, including basic research on GLGE (see section 2).
These alternatives may be used and preferred for different
reasons, including the wish to mitigate or even completely
avoid the controversy regarding embryo research. Parthe-
notes and 3PN embryos are regularly not considered to be
embryos as they lack the potential to develop into a (viable)
child (a condition that is frequently part of the definition of
an embryo). Or alternatively, they are seen as embryos with
a somewhat lower status in view of this diminished
potential [67, 68]. Postponing a stance on the possible
merits of these normative views, it is sufficient for the
moment to state that the research use of parthenotes and
3PN embryos does not pre-empt the need to make use of
normally fertilized oocytes for research, including GLGE-
linked research.
Most controversial is whether it would be ethically
justified to not only make use of left-over or spare embryos,
but also to create embryos specifically for research
purposes, so-called’research embryos’. According to
ESHRE, among others, there is no fundamental, decisive,
ethical difference between the two [69]. After all, both the
moral status and the fate of spare and research embryos are
the same. Still, it is widely—and rightly—accepted that one
should not engage in making embryos specifically for
research if this research can be conducted by using spare
embryos. While spare embryos may be useful for research,
including some types of GLGE-linked research, research
embryos are sometimes necessary. Most importantly, spare
embryos conceived by conventional IVF/ICSI are simply
not useful for safety-research regarding new (pre-concep-
tion or peri-conception) reproductive technologies. Exam-
ples include in vitro maturation (IVM) and stem-cell
derived (‘artificial’) gametes. Likewise, the making of
research embryos is necessary for (some types of) pre-
clinical GLGE research, especially if such research aims at
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studying the effects of GLGE applied in either gametes or
very early embryos, or when such research requires specific
genotypes, not available in spare embryos.
Most jurisdictions accept a time-limit regarding embryo
research of 14 days. Recent research suggests that it will
become possible to grow human embryos in vitro for
longer than 2 weeks. Research beyond 14 days may
increase the value and relevance of both basic and pre-
clinical safety research. This may hold true for GLGE-
linked research as well. As a consequence, a (renewed)
discussion about the ethics of a possible extension of the
time-limit has started [70, 71]. Questions include: what,
precisely, are the arguments in favour of the present 14-
day limit? Are these arguments convincing or could a later
time-limit be ethically and legally justified, and if so, what
limit—and why? What about a slippery slope? Clearly, the
time-limit regarding embryo research should be part of the
agenda for further ethical and societal debate and
reflection.
Another relevant item for the normative debate on
research embryos is the position and protection of candidate
donors of oocytes for research. Concerns regard both the
autonomy and the welfare of oocyte donors. Among others,
ESHRE recommended to impose conditions, in line with
the regular safeguards to protect participants in research,
aimed at minimizing the risk of pressure to donate and
avoiding disproportionate medical risks and exploitation
[65, 72]. Such conditions should also be taken into account
in the context of non-reproductive GLGE research with
research embryos. The future availability of surplus oocytes
frozen (but no longer needed) for fertility preservation
might eliminate or at least lower some of these risks and
concerns.
A final deontological concern emerges with the
possible use of WGS (‘comprehensive’ Preimplantation
Genetic Screening (PGS)) of edited embryos, in the
context of a trio-analysis, as a method to pre-clinically
study and reduce possible off-target effects (iatrogenic
damage) in edited embryos. This strategy would require
specific informed consent from the providers of the spare
embryos or gametes used. The central normative question
raised by such screening would be how to respect the
gamete or embryo providers’ right (not) to know/(not) to
be informed about any incidental findings (IFs) regarding
their own genetic status. This question is not unique to
such GLGE-linked research, as it also arises in the
context of, for example, genomic research making use of
human material in biobanks. Relevant guidelines for the
responsible handling and communication of IFs can be
found in recent literature and documents [73, 74].
4.1.2.2 Consequentialist objection: the ‘slippery slope’
towards reproductive GLGE The slippery slope-argument
against basic GLGE research presumes both that allowing
such research will result in future reproductive applications
(the empirical premise), and that such reproductive
applications are ethically unjustified (the ethical premise).
What about the strength of these premises: are these
convincing?
Both premises are contested. With regard to the empirical
premise, one may argue that reproductive applications of
GLGE will not automatically follow—these could continue
to be forbidden, as is the case now in most countries
worldwide. In scrutinizing the empirical premise of the
slippery slope-objection, it may be important to make a
distinction between basic and pre-clinical GLGE-research
(even though the demarcation is not sharp) as pre-clinical
research may be more vulnerable to this slippery slope
objection than basic research. For that reason, this objection
will be elaborated in that context (see section 4.2).
4.2 Preclinical research
Pre-clinical research aims at assessing the effectiveness and
safety of possible future clinical/reproductive GLGE.
4.2.1 Possible advantages
The general value of pre-clinical research has been
acknowledged in the normative framework for responsible
innovation in assisted reproduction and related technologies
(ART), as proposed by, amongst others, the Health Council
of the Netherlands [65] and (the Task Force on Ethics and
Law of) ESHRE [75]. While new, experimental, reproduc-
tive technologies are often introduced in the clinic without
proper pre-clinical research, including safety studies, this
framework stipulates that pre-clinical research, primarily
aimed at avoiding or at least reducing health risks for
possible future children thus conceived, should be per-
formed as much as is reasonably possible. Such research
could involve using cells/tissues, animals, and human
embryos in vitro (on strict conditions) [65, 75]. The ethical
rationale of pre-clinical safety research is obvious: one
should rather experiment on early embryos in vitro than on
future children thus conceived and prospective parents,
especially mothers. As Anne McLaren eloquently stated: to
refrain from adequate pre-clinical safety studies is like
“making the first test of a new aircraft-guidance system on a
crowded Boeing 747” [76]. This framework would be
relevant for any proposed future clinical applications of
GLGE.
4.2.2 Objections and concerns
4.2.2.1 Deontological objection If human embryos are
used in preclinical research, such research, like basic
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research involving human embryos, is criticized because of
the instrumental use of embryos. As indicated before, this
criticism is based on a widely contested view on the moral
status of the early human embryo (see section 4.1.2).
4.2.2.2 Consequentialist objection: the slippery slope As
stated before (see section 4.1.2), pre-clinical GLGE-
research may be more vulnerable to the slippery slope-
objection than basic GLGE-research; the step from basic
GLGE-research to clinical application of GLGE is much
greater than the step from pre-clinical GLGE-research to
clinical GLGE. After all, the whole idea of pre-clinical
research is to study whether the conditions for sound clin-
ical applications in terms of effectiveness and safety can be
met. But crucially, the slippery slope’s second, ethical,
premise, namely that (any) reproductive GLGE is ethically
unjustified, is not self-evident. In fact, there is wide dis-
agreement regarding the ethics of possible clinical GLGE
apart from safety-concerns. If one would consider, for
example, principled, deontological, objections to clinical
GLGE to be convincing (see section 4.1.2), then pre-clinical
studies would not only be a complete waste (of money,
energy and embryos), but also bring us dangerously close to
the edge of the slope. And as long as it is unclear as to
whether safe clinical GLGE could be morally justified, pre-
clinical safety research can be easily dismissed as premature
(and disproportional). But if only safety issues stand in the
way of morally justified clinical GLGE, then, obviously,
pre-clinical safety studies would be justified.
4.3 Future reproductive human GLGE
4.3.1 Possible advantages
GLGE could, if safe and effective, contribute to greater
welfare, first and foremost in terms of health gains. Such
GLGE could well be more effective than somatic editing
when it comes to multi-organ disease, and have a further
advantage because of its transgenerational or multi-
generational effects. According to some commentators,
GLGE may also have positive—but contested—effects in
terms of enhancement (see below) [77].
Linked to this is the argument of respect for reproductive
autonomy. People at high genetic risk of having a child
affected with a serious disorder or handicap may feel more
confident to reproduce or may see the editing as a pre-
requisite of reproduction [78]. Even though there are other
reproductive options to avoid genetic disorders in future
children, people may have reasons to prefer GLGE (see
below).
Last, but not least, correcting disease-causing genes may
be seen as promoting justice: increasing the equality of
opportunity of every person. The natural unequal
distribution of capabilities (through the genetic lottery) is
corrected by modifying the genetic constitution of persons
who received less than their fair share of capabilities [79].
4.3.2 Objections and concerns
Again, it may be helpful to distinguish different types of
objections and concerns:
4.3.2.1 Deontological objections The deontological
arguments against germline gene modification have been
around for some decades. We will only discuss the more
relevant ones and leave aside the general objections such as
‘it is unnatural’, ‘playing God’ etc. The main problem with
several of the arguments is that they are very broad and
would be applicable to many medical interventions that are
(very) widely accepted, like contraception, fertility treat-
ments and organ transplantation.
An important argument is that germline modifications
threaten human dignity. The Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe stated that human dignity implies ‘the
right to inherit a genetic pattern which has not been
artificially changed’ [80] and also the Council of Europe
declared germline modifications to go against human
dignity [7]. However, if GLGE is used to correct defects
and to restore health in future children, it is difficult to see
how this would show a lack of respect for human dignity. A
specific interpretation of the dignity argument is linked to
the idea that the human species as such should be respected.
Related to this idea is the presentation of the human gene
pool as a ‘common heritage’ that concerns the whole of
humanity [81]. There are at least two problems here. The
first regards the concept of the ‘human gene pool’ [82].
Mistakenly, the human gene pool seems to be seen as a
fixed catalogue of all human genes. It is unclear why the
present catalogue should receive a special status. Moreover,
for the sake of mankind, the gene pool has to continue to
evolve. In addition, the present objection would mean that
every mutation in every new person is problematic. To
avoid this conclusion, one would have to focus on
intentional genomic modifications. However, intentional
modifications need not entail a change in the human gene
pool. Gene editing could for instance be used to repair or
reinsert an already existing gene (i.e. a normal allele).
Supposedly, critics want to prevent the (hypothetical)
introduction of genes that would alter the person to a
point where he or she would have features that no other
human being has. This may be a valid argument against
genetic enhancement (although the line between treatment
and enhancement is difficult to draw, see below), but
not against the editing of disease-causing mutations.
Apart from the fact that human dignity is a very broad
concept and notoriously difficult to define, it looks as if this
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argument cannot serve to condemn all germline gene
modifications.
Another objection is that germline intervention would
violate the autonomy of future children. Different variants
of this objection may be discerned. A first version holds that
GLGE would be at odds with the autonomy of children thus
edited as they did not consent to having their genome
modified [83] nor to being included as research subjects (in
clinical trials). Although correct, this is true for all
reproduction (including natural reproduction) and it is even
theoretically impossible to respect this interpretation of
autonomy since there is no person before or at the moment
of the decision. A second variant of this objection is that
GLGE would undermine (what Joel Feinberg has called) the
child’s right to an open future [84], in that the child would
be pre-determined and pressed into some sort of a ‘mould’ in
order to optimally meet his parents’ expectations. This
would not only ‘instrumentalize’ the particular child, but
would simultaneously undermine respect for human beings
more generally [85]. Again, this criticism may be relevant
for at least some (theoretical, even largely unrealistic) types
of enhancement (see below), but seems not to apply to
editing disease-causing mutations.
A somewhat similar argument is brought forward at the
species level: future generations have a right to an
unmodified gene pool [86]. For some authors, the issue of
germline modification is linked to human rights [87].
Altering fundamental human characteristics may lead to
inequality and unjust situations in two ways: either the
modified ‘people’ would be superior to the unmodified
people and would be unduly privileged, or the modified
‘people’ would no longer be considered as human and
consequently may be deprived of their human rights. But
again, this argument seems to be mostly directed at
enhancement and is not relevant when it comes to
therapeutic or medical editing of disease-causing mutations.
4.3.2.2 Consequentialist objections These objections and
concerns regard the risks of reproductive GLGE. It is
important to discern medical (health related) and social
risks.
4.3.2.2.1 Health/medical risks
The health risks of GLGE concern not just the particular
edited (embryo and) future child, but also next generations (in
plural). The types of risk are rather diverse (see section 2) and
include off-target effects, (antagonistic) pleiotropy, genetic
and epi-genetic risks. While recent literature seems to be
quite reassuring in that new variants of CRISPR are depicted
as having increasingly less off-target effects, at the same time
some experts worry that ‘CRISPR enthusiasts have their head
in the sand’ about the safety of editing [88].
There is a strong consensus worldwide that, in view of the
many unknowns, including the uncertainty about the
reversibility of possible adverse health effects, any clinical
GLGE would be at least premature. The question is whether
it could ever be sound to apply GLGE clinically and if so on
what conditions. In order to reduce health risk for children
thus conceived, a combination of measures and safeguards
could be considered, including:
● performing adequate pre-clinical research,
● embedding possible future reproductive GLGE in a
research trajectory,
● limiting clinical GLGE to causative genes in order to
minimize the risk of pleiotropy,
● adding back-up WGS/whole exome sequencing (WES)-
based PGS (and/or similar prenatal screening), and
● embedding clinical GLGE in long-term follow-up
studies, which may be especially important for risk
reduction for next generations.
Pre-clinical research There is a strong consensus that
clinical GLGE could only be justified after adequate pre-
clinical studies and that more pre-clinical GLGE research
is needed [11, 89]. This approach (‘patience, not patients’)
is in line with the general framework for responsible
innovation in assisted reproduction as developed by,
among others, ESHRE [75] (see section 4.2). Clearly,
questions about risk are not just scientific, but also nor-
mative. The vexing question remains of when findings of
adequate pre-clinical safety studies would be sufficiently
reassuring to justify experimental reproductive technolo-
gies in general and clinical GLGE in particular—how safe
is safe enough? What is the proper evaluation standard for
any such risks? Even after extensive, reassuring pre-
clinical safety-research there will always be a residual risk
that can only be clarified by engaging in clinical research.
A ‘zero risk-tolerance’ criterion would preclude any clin-
ical innovation (because of its inherent risk) and would be
at odds with regular assisted reproduction practice. But
what is, then, the appropriate alternative evaluation stan-
dard? Obviously, it is important to avoid arbitrary and ad
hoc decisions, and to develop a coherent and transparent
policy
A clinical research trajectory- Whether we would
consider the step towards clinical application of GLGE
should depend on the outcomes of basic and pre-clinical
research, taking account of further ethical and legal
discussion, societal views, risks and implications (see
below). If so, this should be embedded in a formal and
rigid research trajectory. According to the Clinical Trials
Regulation EU No.536/2014, Article 90 “No gene therapy
clinical trials may be carried out which result in
modifications to the subject’s germ line genetic identity”
[8]. The implication of this regulation may well be that
clinical GLGE research will be impossible in the European
460 G. De Wert et al.
Union (EU) so that such research takes place outside the
EU and without proper research protocols and oversight.
Focus on causative mutations in order to reduce
pleiotropic risks- While the debate about the health risks
of future clinical GLGE seems to concentrate on off-target
effects, the risk of pleiotropy is as important, including
antagonistic pleiotropy, meaning that decreasing the risk of
developing a particular disease may simultaneously increase
the risk of having another disease. Current knowledge of the
human genome is rather fragmentary—which is a reason for
concern regarding clinical GLGE:
"Pleiotropy may be a widespread phenomenon ….. if
antagonistic pleiotropic effects are pervasive then this
suggests that we use caution when we design genetically-
based treatments for diseases. … a full understanding of the
risks and benefits of undergoing such gene-targeted
treatment is essential to ethical patient care. … Rather than
just focusing on a culprit disease allele and silencing it,
selectively inhibiting the allele’s deleterious pathway while
allowing the beneficial pathway to persist becomes a more
responsible, albeit more difficult, course of action” [90].
This risk seems to be of lesser concern when clinical
GLGE would involve well-known highly penetrant
(causative), clearly pathogenic, mutations linked with
Mendelian diseases—but may be more relevant when
clinical GLGE would involve alleles linked with
complex disorders and traits, caused by less well or
not understood gene-environment or gene-gene inter-
actions. In view of this, GLGE of clearly pathogenic
mutations can more easily be justified as being
proportional than GLGE of less well understood
mutations and genetic variants.
Back-up testing- One might consider including WGS/WES-
based ‘comprehensive’ PGS, combined with a trio-analysis, as
a safeguard to detect off-target effects (iatrogenic damage) in
edited embryos. Clearly, such PGS may simultaneously
generate IFs, including both inherited and de novo mutations.
The ethics of comprehensive PGS is more complex in a
clinical context as compared with using such a safety-test as
part of pre-clinical studies (see above). Ethical issues of the
former include the feasibility of prospective parents’ informed
consent, the proper handling of difficult reproductive genetic
counselling dilemmas, including possible tensions between
transfer criteria and preferences of applicants on the one hand
and professionals on the other, and the possible invasion of
future children’s right to an open future, more in particular
their right not to know about their genetic status, i.e. their
right to decides themselves, later in life, when competent,
about undergoing predictive genetic testing for late(r) onset
diseases [91, 92]. In theory, at least some of these issues could
be avoided or mitigated by an additional round of GLGE of
any IF or off-target effect found—but this scenario seems to
be far-fetched. A more realistic scenario (depending on the
results of pre-clinical research into possible off-target effects
of GLGE) may be to target clinical PGS to possible off-target
effects and to then select an unaffected embryo for transfer.
Maybe, similar WGS/WES-based screening could alterna-
tively be considered during pregnancy.
Follow-up- Part of the framework for responsible
innovation in assisted reproduction is the follow-up of
children conceived through new, experimental reproductive
technologies [65, 75]. A fortiori, any future clinical GLGE
should be embedded in such follow-up studies. Experience
so far with follow-up studies linked with ARTs shows that
there are practical barriers and limits in terms of, for
example, lack of funding and tensions with parental
autonomy and familial and children’s privacy, especially
when it comes to long-term follow-up, as would be the ideal
in this context.
Many critics of GLGE argue that there are safer
alternatives, especially PGD or more precisely: PGD
combined with a selective transfer of a ‘healthy’ embryo.
In view of these alternatives, it is sometimes questioned as to
whether there is a real need for human GLGE (see below).
4.3.2.2.2 Societal risks and concerns
There are different types of societal risks and concerns.
We will focus here on four of these, two of which are often
addressed under the heading of ‘eugenics’. As eugenics is a
term with very different meanings, we will avoid this term
as much as possible and point to specific societal concerns
covered by this term [93].
Disability rights- A first concern is that GLGE may have
negative consequences for (at least some) people with
handicaps and disorders. This concern, which does not
regard GLGE specifically, but reproductive and genetic
medicine more generally, is often called ‘the disability rights
critique’. In the background of this critique is the tension
between the medical and the social model of disability [94,
95]. While the medical model, aimed at prevention and
treatment of disease, is based on an individualistic account
of disability that focuses on the biological deficit, the social
model stresses societal and cultural co-determinants of
disability, like exclusion of people with impairments,
environmental barriers to participation, stigmatizing cultural
discourse, and discrimination. In recent years, patient
organizations (sometimes explicitly under the umbrella of
the disability rights movement) have substantially con-
tributed to a public policy agenda aimed at strengthening
the societal position, interests and rights of people with
disabilities through barrier removal, anti-discrimination
legislation and inclusion of people with disabilities. At the
same time, patient organizations are very much in favour of
research on new therapies.
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The disability rights concern comes in different forms
[79]. One is the so-called ‘expressivist’ argument, holding
that genetic interventions, including GLGE, express
negative judgments about the worth of the life of people
with disabilities, which would violate their right to be
regarded as persons of equal standing. Obviously, society
should (continue to) protect the equal rights of people with
impairments. However, it is difficult to see how this would
amount to an argument against developing new (genetic or
non-genetic) therapies which may substantially improve
their quality of life and avoid serious suffering. A second
concern is that both preventive and therapeutic medical
interventions, including GLGE, could reinforce the tradi-
tional medical model, with its blindness for sociocultural
determinants of disability. While a one-dimensional medical
approach is, indeed, to be avoided, this is not an argument
against developing new treatment options either. A final
concern is articulated as the ‘loss-of-support’ argument, i.e.
that to the extent that genetic science, prevention and
therapy will lead to reducing the number of disabled people,
public and political support for these people will also
dwindle. While this concern underlines the continued
responsibility of society for also supporting lower numbers
of people with particular handicaps, this is again not a good
reason to refrain from developing new types of prevention
or therapy, such as germline or somatic gene editing. If we
would accept the loss-of-support argument, we should also
stop current preventative programmes, such as recommend-
ing folic acid to pregnant women in order to reduce the risk
of neural tube defects—which would be unacceptable.
Some commentators, taking the social model to its
extreme, argue that there is no real need to invest in the
development of new treatments, genetic or otherwise. In
their view it is society that needs to be treated, rather than
people with impairments. While it is certainly true that at
least part of the problems that many people with
impairments encounter could be diminished or even
avoided if society were more inclusive of diversity, the
problems of people with impairments cannot simply be
reduced to prejudice and exclusion. The extreme variant of
the social model disregards limitations that cannot be erased
in even the most ‘barrier-free utopia’ [95, 96].
All in all, the disability rights critique forcefully reminds
society of its responsibilities towards people with disabil-
ities, more particularly its obligation to remove barriers for
inclusion, but it should not be used as an argument against
the development of medical therapies, including GE,
irrespective of whether it is somatic or germline GE.
The undermining of reproductive autonomy- Concerns
have been raised that reproductive GLGE will increase the
pressure to avoid the conception of affected/handicapped
babies and as a result undermine prospective parents’
reproductive freedom. This may happen in different ways:
by more or less subtle moral and social pressure or even by
legal enforcement (direct coercion). How likely is this
scenario, how is to be evaluated and what are the
implications for policy-making regarding clinical GLGE?
For evaluating this objection, it is important to place
GLGE in the broader context of repro-gene-ethics and
options to avoid the birth of (seriously) affected/handi-
capped children. Although views about prospective parents’
responsibility regarding the handling of possible reproduc-
tive genetic risk vary widely, there is a strong consensus in
ethics that taking reproductive genetic risks is not ethically
indifferent and that prospective parents should, in principle,
try to avoid at least high risks of serious suffering for future
children. This is widely considered to be a moral—not a
legal—responsibility. Direct coercion (legal enforcement) to
make use of ‘preventive’ options, such as prenatal testing
and selective abortion or PGD, maybe linked with GLGE,
would be ethically and legally unjustified—and seems to be
rather unlikely, at least in democratic countries respecting
human rights. Still, socio-moral pressure to avoid high
genetic risks of having a seriously affected child may
increase as the possibilities for such avoidance grow. In
fact, this is a worry already regularly mentioned and
encountered in the context of current repro-genetic options,
like making use of donor gametes, prenatal testing and
PGD, although there may also be pressure, at least in some
cultures and families, to not make use of these options.
Importantly, however, this risk is not widely considered to
be a convincing objection to the offering of such options.
On the contrary, these options are considered valuable first
and foremost as they may allow prospective parents to take
measures to avoid the conception or birth of seriously
affected children in their families. In view of this, and
taking account of the fact that GLGE would add only a little
to any already existing, more or less subtle, social pressure,
it would be problematic and inconsistent to prohibit GLGE
in order to protect reproductive autonomy. Instead of
selectively and arbitrarily prohibiting a particular technol-
ogy in order to protect future reproductive freedom, society
should uphold and materialize its willingness and commit-
ment to provide adequate medical care and societal support
for each and every handicapped baby. Any punishment of
parents who conceive a handicapped baby, whose concep-
tion and/or birth could have been prevented, by withholding
(funding for) adequate medical care of such babies would
not only undermine the reproductive confidence and
autonomy of prospective parents, it would also be highly
unjust to these babies [97, 98] and unacceptable at a societal
level.
In the context of applying for assisted reproduction, the
situation may be somewhat more complex. According to the
widely accepted normative framework for genetic counsel-
ling and testing in reproduction, the central ethical principle
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is respect for reproductive autonomy. This is made
operational by underscoring the importance of both the
prerequisite of voluntariness (as part of informed consent)
and the ideal of non-directive counselling, which implies
that doctors should support prospective parents at high risk
of having an affected child, whatever reproductive option
they select, preferably after an exploration of what options
are available and what their ‘considered feelings and views’
are in relation to these. This accepted ethical guidance for
reproductive genetic counselling is, however, not entirely
applicable in the context of assisted reproduction. After all,
doctors involved have the professional responsibility to take
account of the welfare of the possible future child and to
refrain from medically assisted reproduction in case of ‘a
high risk of serious suffering/harm’ to the child [75]. In
view of this, it may be morally justified to offer PGD to
applicants at high genetic risk of having a seriously affected
child as a condition for access to assisted reproduction—a
so-called ‘coercive’ offer [99]. If so, a case could perhaps be
made for offering GLGE (instead of PGD aimed at a
selective transfer of a ‘healthy’ embryo) to prospective
parents at high genetic risk as a condition for access to
assisted reproduction. There may well be different views
about whether this would indeed be acceptable—but, even
if clearly problematic, this scenario is not a good reason to
refrain from offering GLGE (if proven to be safe and
effective) at all.
‘Enhancement’: designer babies- An important concern is
the fear that prospective parents (and clinicians/companies)
may engage in making so-called designer babies. Like
‘eugenics’, the terms ‘germline enhancement’ and ‘designer
baby’ are often not precisely defined. Mostly, the terms
seem to refer to modifying/editing the genome of future
children for non-medical reasons, or, maybe more precisely,
for the improvement of normal traits. Examples often
mentioned include raising cognitive skills/IQ, a social
attitude/empathy, and exceptional musical and sporting
capacities. But strengthening the resistance to diseases or
eliminating carrier status for recessive conditions
(in situations where being a carrier has no clinical
significance for the health of the carrier himself) can also
be regarded as forms of enhancement—which illustrates the
conceptual blurring of medical and non-medical, preventa-
tive and enhancement-like applications [79, 100, 101].
People have different expectations regarding the feasi-
bility of germline enhancement. While ‘designer baby’ talk
plays a major role both in the imagination of the public and
in scenarios discussed by policymakers and philosophers/
ethicists (partly as a consequence of the genetic reduction-
ism communicated by many high-profile geneticists in the
past), most biomedical experts seem to consider this as
science fiction, at least insofar as making a ‘designer baby’
would require the modification of complex traits. Some
recent publications clearly state that even with the most
accurate and reliable version of CRISPR, programming
favourable traits in human embryos may not be possible
[102, 103]. Technology is not the limiting factor in the
enhancement of individuals, but rather, so it is argued, it is
nature. A trait can be edited in the germline only when two
conditions are met. First, the trait must be predominantly
determined by DNA—its heritability must be close to
100%. According to a recent review, most potentially
desirable traits have a moderate heritability; for example,
the heritability of intelligence and higher-level cognitive
functioning is around 50% [104]. Second, for enhancement
to be practical, the traits in question must be caused by a
single variant or an interaction among a limited number of
variants. Although it may become possible to edit DNA
accurately at multiple loci, it is unlikely, so the argument
continues, that we will learn anytime soon how to
successfully edit tens or hundreds of variants simulta-
neously. GLGE for enhancement purposes should, then, be
considered a non-issue: “(….) progress should not be
hindered by an ethical debate about a potential misuse of the
technology that will not be possible” [102].
Others disagree, however, for different reasons. First,
there may well be some not a priori unrealistic examples of
enhancement of less complex traits, such as resistance to
particular infections. Second, while successfully editing
tens or hundreds of variants simultaneously is not a realistic
option at the moment, this may well change. And third:
some prospective parents may want to make use of CRISPR
—if safe and affordable—for more complex normal traits
even if a successful programming of the desired trait cannot
be guaranteed—a significant increase of the likelihood of
the phenotype may be ‘good enough’ for them to proceed. It
is not unrealistic, then, to expect that commercial companies
and professional GLGE ‘enthusiasts’ may want to exploit
prospective parents’ dreams (or their fears to lag behind) by
selling them this technology as a means to at least improve
their chances of having a ‘perfect child’ (however that is
understood). Even if the designing is still imperfect, this
may be a highly lucrative market (think of the analogy with
companies which offer direct-to-consumer tests). Competi-
tion for a market share may lead these companies to
exaggerate both the heritability of the relevant traits and the
probability of the effectiveness of GLGE. They might also
see an attractive market in advertising ‘smart combinations’
of GLGE and life-style modification, thus bypassing any
accusations of outdated genetic reductionism.
Ethical evaluations of GLGE enhancement differ, not just
because of different normative views, but also because the
concepts and examples used differ significantly. In the early
days of the debate on GLGE there was an almost
unanimous support for the view that we can and should
make a sharp distinction, both conceptually and ethically,
Innovation in human germline gene editing: the background 463
between gene therapy and enhancement, of which only the
former could be morally sound [105]. But this strong
consensus seems to have disappeared, maybe surprisingly
quickly [101, 106]. So-called ‘liberal eugenics’, arguing that
prospective parents should be largely free to genetically
design their future children, has gained considerable
support, at least in the academic literature—which is not
to say that anything goes. Most commentators who consider
the idea of drawing a rigid line between (germline gene)
therapy and enhancement to be problematic, both concep-
tually and ethically, seem to argue in favour of different
ethical evaluations of specific types of genetic enhance-
ment. Anticipating a better scientific understanding of the
complexity of our genome and further technical develop-
ments and breakthroughs in the field of GLGE, it might be
helpful to make a distinction between non-medical and
medical genetic enhancement, and, with regard to the
former, between ‘instrumentalizing’ and ‘non-instrumenta-
lizing’ types of genetic enhancement. A more detailed
reflection is beyond the scope of this paper (and, in view of
the current state of science, highly hypothetical), so we only
add a few remarks:
● medical genetic enhancement: an often used example is
the strengthening of the human immune system. This, so
it is argued, may not be a priori unsound, as it is linked
with the classical aim(s) of medicine and may in fact be
comparable with traditional vaccination. A second
example would be the editing of embryos carrying
recessive conditions. While some authors seem to
simply assume that this would be ethically sound
[107], others would probably dismiss this as a proble-
matic form of population eugenics.
● non-medical genetic enhancement: this is widely
considered to be ethically unsound. Major objections
are that this would be at odds with human dignity, would
instrumentalize the child and undermine its right to an
open future [85, 96, 108]. But some scholars argue that
non-medical germline GLGE would not necessarily
instrumentalize the future child and should not be
categorically dismissed. Some traits are, so it is argued,
‘general purpose’ means i.e. capacities that are useful
and valuable in carrying out nearly any plan of life or set
of aims that humans typically have [79, 109]. A good
example is intelligence; a genetically (or otherwise)
enhanced IQ would not limit the child’s right to an open
future.
Even if the reasoning behind the latter view is sound,
there are additional issues to be addressed—apart from the
fact that precisely the example of genetically enhancing IQ
is, because of the complexity of this trait, qualified by most
genetic experts as totally unrealistic. One further issue is the
need to take account of the possible implications of the
phenomenon of pleiotropy, especially antagonistic pleio-
tropy. This is a more relevant issue in the context of
possible GLGE of complex traits than when it is about
GLGE of causative genes with a clear pathogenic effect (see
above). Taking pleiotropic risks can be more easily
considered to be proportional when it is linked with
avoiding a serious disease than when it is merely about
enhancing a normal, healthy future child.
No doubt, these conceptual and normative issues require a
more detailed analysis and debate. For the moment, it is
important to acknowledge that any enhancement-oriented
GLGE of complex traits is far beyond what may become
possible in the next few years or even decades—and may
never become a realistic option. That said, at least two policy
questions are on the agenda right now. First, how do we
tackle the risk of commercial exploitation of uninformed,
naïve, parental dreams about perfect children? Second, is it
acceptable or wise to take the slippery slope-risk that
allowing GLGE, even if only for serious disorders, will in
the end (irrespective of well-intended mechanisms to avoid
this, like strict criteria/indications and procedures for societal
oversight of GLGE-practice) result in all sorts of germline
enhancements? This question, like the question mentioned
previously regarding the ethical evaluation of residual health
risks of possible future clinical GLGE, should be addressed
taking account of another question: what is the added value
of GLGE, in view of the currently available therapeutic and
reproductive alternatives (see below)?
Inequity- GLGE will in most scenarios be a very
expensive procedure. Even if the gene editing in itself
may not necessarily be expensive, the accompanying steps
(IVF, PGD, safety measures, etc.) most likely will be. This
raises the question of who will have access to the
technology. This question is raised for every emerging
technique and should be considered within the context of
the distribution of scarce resources. The inclusion or
exclusion of an ART procedure in a decent package of
reimbursed health care will depend on the wealth of the
state and on the status attributed to infertility. At the
moment, some countries have generous provisions for
medically assisted reproduction while others largely leave
this to the private market. However, all countries have limits
for the spending of public resources on infertility treatment
(e.g., female age, number of cycles). These limits are
justified by different criteria: efficiency, cost-effectiveness
and safety. The same criteria could be used for the decision
regarding the reimbursement of GLGE. Three general
remarks may be sufficient for the moment. First, decisions
on reimbursement and access could be made in steps. One
could for instance at the start only provide reimbursement
for certain types of diseases. Second, most affluent societies
strive to give equal access to medical care for everyone.
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That does not mean that when equity is not reached, no one
should have access to the treatment. This ‘levelling down’
justice would in fact block all progress in medicine. Third,
affordability may also to a large extent depend on patenting
and commercialization of the technique [110].
Beside the matter of access based on financial means,
there is a second justice consideration that refers to
prioritization of diseases. Here too, several criteria can be
used: magnitude and frequency of need, cost-effectiveness,
the existence of alternative interventions, etc. [89]. The
experience with the introduction of other techniques, such
as PGD, may help to design a strategy here.
Likewise, GLGE ‘enhancements’ to subsets of the
population could exacerbate social inequities—although
this threat may be somewhat exaggerated in view of the
serious scientific doubts about the feasibility of most, rather
theoretical, GLGE-enhancements.
4.3.3 Alternatives for reproductive GLGE: ‘no real need’ for
the latter?
In view of both the medical and societal objections and
concerns, alternative options should be taken into account
for parents ‘at high risk’ of having an affected child and who
do not wish to have children affected by the specific con-
dition they are at risk for. The alternatives may be of two
different types: first, therapeutic (postnatal)/non-reproduc-
tive, and second, reproductive. The most obvious ther-
apeutic alternative may be somatic GLGE. Reproductive
alternatives include adoption, prenatal diagnosis, the use of
donor gametes and (IVF/ICSI) PGD aimed at transferring a
‘healthy’ embryo. The availability of possible alternatives
seems to strengthen the reluctance and opposition to future
reproductive GLGE [100, 111]: ‘there is no real need to
engage in germline GE’ [112]. But what about the effec-
tivity and availability of these alternatives? And does the
balancing of the pros and cons of these alternatives indeed
lead to the conclusion that these are to be ethically
preferred?
While expectations regarding the effectiveness and future
clinical utility of somatic GE seem to increase, (safe and
effective) GLGE could have two comparative advantages: it
is more efficient because of its multi-generational pre-
ventive/therapeutic potential, and it may be more effective
for the prevention/therapy of multi-organ disorders, at least
in theory. For at least a subset of such genetic disorders,
somatic GLGE is simply not a realistic option. Somatic GE
may become an effective treatment for less complex (single
organ) disorders, and preferred by many, even if GLGE
would prove to be safe and effective. But, obviously, con-
text matters. If, for example, prospective parents at high
genetic risk are sub-fertile and apply for IVF/ICSI anyway,
their fertility treatment might be relatively easy combined
with GLGE, if safe and effective, instead of anticipating
repeated somatic GE in consecutive generations.
With regard to reproductive alternatives several issues
need further discussion, including:
● Many prospective parents at high genetic risk do not
meet the stringent criteria for adopting a child, as
accepted in the relevant jurisdictions. Maybe these
criteria could be relaxed—but even then, this may not be
a real, let alone the ideal, solution for at least some
prospective parents;
● Most prospective parents prefer to have a genetically
related child—adoption or donor gametes are either not
an option at all (the use of donor gametes is forbidden in
many countries) or only second best. How to morally
evaluate this preference? Obviously, this is a funda-
mental question that concerns reproductive medicine
generally. Even if one would argue that counselling
might help prospective parents to reconsider their
preference (‘people can be very happy without having
children’, and/or ‘children need not be genetically linked
in order to build a happy family’), to disregard people’s
persistent preferences for a genetically linked child
would be difficult to justify in view of the principle of
respect for reproductive autonomy. Still, a further debate
about the (relativity of the) value of ‘genetic parenthood’
is important.
There is no doubt that PGD aimed at a selective transfer
of an unaffected embryo can and does help many pro-
spective parents ‘at high genetic risk’ to have a (genetically
related) unaffected child. To argue, however, that therefore
GLGE is not really needed, is a non sequitur:
● In some (admittedly rare) cases, prospective parents can
only have affected children, for example, when both
partners are affected by the same autosomal recessive
disorder. PGD is, then, a priori pointless.
● Instead of routinely discarding affected PGD-embryos, a
differentiated ranking system may be preferable, which
prioritizes unaffected embryos for transfer while cryo-
preserving the (good morphology) affected embryo(s)
for a possible thawing, editing (if safe and effective) and
transfer in a next cycle. This policy may well increase
the take-home-baby-rate of IVF/ICSI-PGD cycles and
be more patient-friendly.
● Furthermore, in a significant number of cases, all embryos
in a given IVF/ICSI-PGD cycle lack the criteria for
transfer, either because they all prove to be affected (think
especially of so-called ‘combination PGD’, performed for
two indications), or because the embryos prove to be
unaffected, but not a good match for a diseased sib
needing hematopoietic stem cells (in the context of PGD/
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HLA-typing, aimed at conceiving a health ‘saviour’ baby).
The couple may then engage in a new cycle or consider
transferring an affected embryo or an HLA-mismatched
embryo. If effective and safe GLGE becomes possible in
the future, an additional IVF/ICSI-PGD cycle would be
disproportional in view of its (avoidable) burdens and
risks (and costs). And wouldn’t the transfer of an affected
embryo be unsound if one could avoid the birth of an
affected child by GLGE?
● For a comparative moral evaluation of ‘standard’ PGD
and (PGD combined with) GLGE, some deontological
aspects may be relevant as well. First, as ‘standard’ PGD
aiming at a selective transfer entails the de-selection (and
destruction) of embryos, while GLGE may (avoid or) at
least reduce embryo loss, the latter strategy may be the
morally better one (if safe and effective and) if one
acknowledges that the embryo has a significant moral
status -which is not necessarily to be identified with a
strict ‘pro-life’ view. Second, if prospective parents prefer
reasonably safe and effective GLGE instead of PGD
aimed at a selective transfer, to not accept this may be at
odds with respect for reproductive autonomy.
4.3.4 Comprehensive PGS: a driver for systematic GLGE?
Assuming further technological improvements, compre-
hensive PGS, making use of high-resolution sequencing
technology, could be used not only as an instrument in basic
and pre-clinical GLGE research (see section 4.1 and 4.2 )
and as a safeguard in possible future clinical GLGE (see
section 4.3.2), but also it might be (routinely) used in the
context of future regular IVF. In fact, the latter is sometimes
advocated in the medical literature for selecting ‘the best
embryo’ for transfer. Such PGS—which raises a lot of
ethical issues (see section 4.3.2) [91, 92]—might then
function as a powerful ‘driver’ for clinical GLGE, if proven
to be safe, effective and applicable to day 3 or even day 5
embryos; it might be argued that all embryos, like all
humans, are ‘fellow mutants’ and will prove to be ‘affected’
or ‘at risk’ in different ways, being among others hetero-
zygous for some recessive conditions, and carrying pre-
dispositions for more or less common disorders,
polymorphisms, and genetic variants. The challenge may
then become to find and edit the embryo with the ‘best’ risk
profile, which would push the application of GLGE far
beyond the ‘high risk of serious disease’—cases where it is
regularly considered to be possibly sound in current ethical
literature. Especially private clinics and clinics in countries
with a lack of adequate regulation may want to (commer-
cially) offer routine comprehensive PGS combined with
gene editing of any ‘defect’ found. Obviously, this scenario
would be problematic in view of the pleiotropic risks of
GLGE, as these can be more easily considered to be
proportional if linked to avoiding a serious disease than
when it is just about editing lower risk factors or, particu-
larly, enhancing a normal, healthy future child. But at the
same time, this scenario urges society even more strongly
(than GLGE of one particular disease characteristic)
to engage in a more principled debate about the ethics of,
and policymaking regarding, the conceptually and morally
grey area between therapeutic, preventive, and enhancing
GLGE.
5 Recommendations
Based on this overview of the ethical and legal considera-
tions, ESHG and ESHRE consider it to be their professional
responsibility to contribute to further discussion on GLGE.
Based on this Background document, Recommendations
have been developed and discussed within both societies
[12, 13]. We encourage other stakeholders to also engage in
this debate.
Summary
What does this study mean for the patients?
● This paper is the background to Recommendations from
the European Society of Human Reproduction and
Embryology (ESHRE) and the European Society of
Human Genetics (ESHG), which considers the issue of
gene editing of sperm, oocytes or embryos.
● Editing the genetic make-up of sperm, oocytes or
embryos has the potential to help people with hereditary
diseases, but there are currently many legal barriers to
this across Europe. There are also many ethical
questions as this type of gene editing would lead to
hereditary genetic changes being passed down from one
generation to the next. This would have potential
benefits for people suffering from inherited conditions,
but more research is needed to ensure it would be safe
and effective and there is still much ethical debate about
such research itself.
● The paper summarizes the different ethical objections,
legal barriers, research issues and practical problems
which currently prevent this type of gene editing being
used and provides a background briefing for the
Recommendations the two Societies have made.
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